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MARKING THE PATH POST-COTTON: THE SUPREME
COURT REAFFIRMS DUAL TAXATION IN MONTANA V.
CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS
Heather G. Pennington.
In Montana v. Crow Tribe ofindians,' the Supreme Court held
that the Crow Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") was not entitled to receive
disgorgement of improperly levied severance and gross proceed taxes.
The taxes at issue had been paid by the Tribe's non-Indian mineral
lessee to the State of Montana and Big Horn County prior to 1982.
Although the Supreme Court had already upheld the Tribe's right to
receive the post- 1982 tax payments,2 the Court refused to force the state
to return the pre-1982 tax payments on equitable grounds. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court's decision reaffirmed and strengthened its holding
in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico.3 In that case, the Court held
that states have the ability to tax the on-reservation activities of non-
Indian mineral lessees concurrently with tribal governments. The
decision in Montana v. Crow Tribe adds a new chapter to the "dual
taxation" history and emphasizes the legitimacy of states' authority to
tax non-Indian activity on reservations. By allowing Montana to keep
taxes that the Supreme Court had already deemed excessive, the Court
gave other states better leverage to impose new taxes on non-Indian
mineral activity within Indian reservations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In 1904, the Crow Tribe of Indians ceded approximately
1,137,500 acres of reservation property ("ceded strip") to the United
-B.A. Dartmouth College, 1997, J.D. expected University of Kentucky, May 2000.
'523 U.S. 696, 118 S.Ct. 1650 (1998)[hereinafter Crow Tribe].2Montana v Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 997 (1988), affg 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir.
1987).
3490 U.S. 163 (1989).
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States for settlement by non-Indians.4 While the surface rights to the
ceded strip eventually were conveyed to non-Indians, the United States
held the mineral rights underlying the tract in trust for the Tribe.5
In 1972, the Tribe first entered into a coal mining lease
covering 31,000 acres of the ceded strip with Westmoreland Resources
("Westmoreland"), a non-Indian company.6  Pursuant to the
requirements of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 ("IMLA"), 7 the
Department of the Interior approved the lease. In 1974, the Tribe and
Westmoreland re-negotiated the lease. The Tribe's new royalties were
some of the highest received by any coal lessor in the United States
In July of 1975, the State of Montana imposed a severance and
gross proceeds tax on all coal within the state, including coal from
Indian reservation property.9 Combined, the gross proceeds and
severance tax rates constituted thirty-five percent of the contract sales
price of the coal.'0 Accordingly, Westmoreland paid roughly $46.8
million in severance taxes to the state and $11.4 million in gross
proceeds taxes to Big Horn County.1
Only six months later the Tribe attempted to impose its own
twenty-five percent severance tax on all coal mining within the
boundaries of the reservation.' 2 In accordance with the IMLA, any tax
levied by the Tribe first had to receive approval from the Department
of the Interior before the tax could become effective. 3 In 1977,
however, the Department of the Interior approved the tax only with
respect to coal that lay within the reservation proper. The Department
refused to extend the reach of the Tribe's tax to the ceded strip.'4 Thus,
the Tribe could not tax any of the coal produced by its lessee,
4
Crow Tribe, 118 S.Ct. at 1653.
5
Id.61d. at 1654.
7The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,25 U.S.C. 396a to 396(t)[hereinafter IMLA].8Crow Tribe, 118 S.Ct. at 1654.
9
1d. See also MONT. CODE ANN. 15-23-701 to 15-23-704, 15-35-101 to 15-35-111







MONTANA V. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS
Westmoreland. In 1982, the Tribe once more sought to impose its
severance tax on mining activity within the ceded strip. 5 Again, the
Department of Interior refused to allow the tax because the Tribe's
constitution limited its jurisdiction to the reservation boundaries. 6
In 1982, the Tribe and Westmoreland entered into an amended
lease agreement that again required Department of Interior approval.
This agreement provided that Westmoreland would pay the Tribe a tax
equal to that the state received, less any amount that Westmoreland was
required to pay the state and Big Horn County. 7 Reversing its earlier
position regarding the Tribe's authority to tax mineral production within
the ceded strip, the Department of the Interior approved this amended
lease agreement.' 8 The agreement served two purposes. First, it
enabled Westmoreland to avoid double taxation. And second, the
agreement allowed the Tribe to put into place a Department-approved
tax that would enable the Tribe to receive tax revenues from mining on
the ceded strip ifthe Tribe could have the state's tax invalidated via
judicial proceedings.
B. Procedural History
The Tribe initiated judicial proceedings to invalidate Montana's
tax in 1978 when it filed a suit in federal court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from the state taxes.' 9 The district court, however, held
the severance test was valid and dismissed the case. 20 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case.2" The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the minerals underlying the ceded strip formed a
"component of the Reservation land itself."' 2 Thus, according to the






19Crow Tribe v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 1979).20Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S. Ct. 1650, 1655 (1998).21Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), amended, 665 F.2d 1390
(9th Cir. 1982)[hereinafter Crow 1].221d. at 1117.
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J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
taxation was actually in place as early as 1977 when the Department
had first approved the Tribe's authority to tax mineral production within
the reservation proper. The Ninth Circuit also found that if the Tribe's
allegations proved true, the IMLA would preempt state taxation.23 In
addition, the court noted that Montana's taxes might also be invalidated
because they impermissibly interfered with the Tribe's sovereignty.
24
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit observed, "[A]s to the taxes already paid
by Westmoreland ... it is true that the Tribe has not paid any of the
taxes and is apparently not entitled to any refund if the tax statutes are
declared invalid. 25
It was after this Ninth Circuit decision that the Tribe entered
into the 1982 amended lease agreement with Westmoreland described
above.26 The Tribe and Westmoreland soon thereafter moved to deposit
the severance tax payments into the Federal District Court for Montana
until the litigation concluded. This motion was granted.27 The district
court later ordered the same temporary relief for the gross proceeds tax
in 1987.28
In 1983, the United States intervened as the Tribe's trustee for
its mineral rights.29 The district court held a trial in January of 1984 to
determine whether the IMLA preempted the imposition of Montana's
coal taxes.30 The district court concluded that the IMLA did not
preempt state taxation.3t However, the Ninth Circuit again reversed the
decision of the lower court with its decision in Crow Tribe vMontana.32
The Ninth Circuit held that Montana's taxes were preempted by the
IMLA.33 In addition, the court found that Montana's taxes
23Id. at 1113-1115.
241d. at 1115-1117.
25Id. at 1113, n. 13.





291d. at 1656.30Crow Tribe v. United States, 657 F.Supp. 573 (D.Mont. 1985).
3
1Id.
32819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'g 657 FSupp. 573 (D.Mont. 1985)[hereinater
Crow 11].
3Montana vCrow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. 1650,1656 (1998) (citing Crowl, 819
F. 2d at 903).
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impermissibly interfered with tribal sovereignty. 3  In 1988, the
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the holding of Crow J1.35
After the Supreme Court decision, the district court ordered the
distribution of the severance and gross proceed taxes that it had
received as a deposit.36 Thus, the Tribe received over twenty-three
million dollars in tax payments that Westmoreland had made from 1982
to 1988."7
At this point, the Tribe and the United States filed an amended
complaint against the state and Big Horn County that eventually
culminated in this Supreme Court decision. The amended complaint
sought the recovery of the pre-1982 tax payments totaling $58.2
million. 3' The Tribe and the United States posited theories ofassumpsit
and constructive trust in support of their amended complaint.39 The
plaintiffs argued that because the Supreme Court had declared illegal
the taxes collected by the state and Big Horn County, the Tribe
equitably deserved the pre-1982 payments.4" Montana countered with
the argument that Westmoreland was the only party possibly entitled to
a refund, as it was the payer of the taxes in question.41 Westmoreland,
however, had already entered into an agreement to dismiss any claim
it had for a refund from the state or Big Horn County.42 Thus, the state
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion,
but agreed to submit it to the Court of Appeals for interlocutory
appeal .
Initially, the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the appeal; however,
one year later, the court dismissed the appeal as "improvidently
granted." 44 In its dismissal (Crow111), the Court observed that the "sole




Montana v. Crow Tribe, 484 U.S. 997 (1988).36












4Montana v. United States, 969 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1992)[hereinafter Crow III].
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to "state a claim for relief in assumpsit and constructive trust." Because
the Ninth Circuit concluded that that particular issue had- been
addressed in Crow 11, the court refused to hear the appeal.45
The district court then conducted a trial on the merits to
determine whether the Tribe had any right to the tax payments that
Westmoreland had made prior to 1982. The district court concluded.
that the "factors justifying preemption did not impel the disgorgement
relief demanded by the Tribe." 46 The district court considered a number
of factors. In examining this decision, the Supreme Court noted that
"the respective taxing authority of State and Tribe" was "key" to the
district court's reasoning.47 First, the district court relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's holding in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
48
where the Supreme Court expressly allowed both the State of New
Mexico and the Jicarillo Apache Tribe to tax the mining activity of a
non-Indian mineral lessee on reservation land.49 Second, the district
court observed that the Tribe could not enforce its severance tax on
Westmoreland prior to the 1982 amended lease agreement, because the
Tribe had been unable to get the Department of Interior's approval for
taxes levied on mining activity within the ceded strip.5° Third, the
district court noted that the 1982 amended lease agreement between the
Tribe and Westmoreland "stipulated that Westmoreland would have no
tax liability to the Tribe for the 1976 to 1982 period."51 The district
court also considered the services that the state and Big Horn County
provided in the ceded strip area as evidence of the state's authority to
levy taxes.52
Once again, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's
conclusions. In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the district court's "denial of equitable reliefwas an abuse of discretion.
Nearly all of the equitable considerations advanced in support of the
45
Montana v Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S. Ct. 1650, 1657 (1998).
4'1d. at 1658.
471d. at 1657.
41490 U.S. 163 (1989).
9
1d.
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retention of the unlawful taxes by the state were rejected explicitly or
rendered irrelevant by this court's previous decisions." 3
The Ninth Circuit took issue with the district court decisions
because it felt the district court's holding contradicted "the law of the
case" established in Crow I, Crow 11 and Crow III:" First, the Ninth
Circuit noted that it had held in Crow I that the Tribe was still entitled
to equitable relief, "despite the absence of traditional requirements for
relief under theories of assumpsit or constructive trust."55 The Ninth
Circuit also observed that it had decided the state's provision of general
services to the ceded strip was not a dispositive issue for two reasons.
First, the tax should have been levied only to cover coal related
services, whereas the revenues generated by this tax served a variety of
interests. Second, the court noted that the state would have provided
these same general services even if the coal had never been mined.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit declared that the ability of the Tribe to
tax mining in the ceded strip was irrelevant because it had held in Crow
11 that the "Tribe was harmed ...because the taxes imposed by
Montana had an adverse impact on the Tribe's ability to market its coal,
increased the costs of coal production, and reduced the royalty the Tribe
could charge.,56 Thus, when the Ninth Circuit weighed the equities, it
concluded that the Tribe's interest was stronger than the state's.
57
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision and
remanded the case. Montana appealed and this decision by the
Supreme Court ensued.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's decision in Crow Tribe added to the
already extensive body of case law regarding taxation of Native
53Crow Tribe v. Montana, 92 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 98 F.3d 1194(9th
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Americans.58 A study of this jurisprudence invariably begins with the
United States Constitution, which granted Congress the authority to
regulate commerce with Native Americans.59 In fact, Congressional
authority in this area is so extensive that federal law preempts state
regulation in the absence of express federal consent to state regulation.
Thus, federal field preemption in Native American affairs differs from
the more general federal field preemption doctrine because the courts
reverse their presumptions. Whereas in a general preemption case
courts may presume a state has the authority to act absent some
indication of Congress's intent to preempt, in a case involving Native
Americans courts assume a state is preempted from acting unless the
court has some indication of Congress's intent to allow a state to act.6
For example, the Ninth Circuit observed in Crow 11 that "[t]he
preemption analysis in Indian tribal cases differs from that used in other
circumstances" because the courts do not require an express statement
of congressional intent to preempt. Instead, courts regard a conflict
with the "purpose or operation" ofa federal statute, regulation or policy
as sufficient grounds for preemption.6
The extent to which this Indian preemption analysis precludes
state taxation of tribal mineral interests has been obscured by
Congressional legislation. For example, in 1924 Congress explicitly
allowed state taxation of tribal mineral interests in the Act of May 29,
1924.62 In 1938, however, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act 63 called into
question the ability of a state to tax tribal mineral interests because the
more recent act was silent on the issue of states' authority to tax.
Furthermore, the IMLA also contained a general repealing clause that
was added to repeal all previous Congressional legislation regarding
mineral production on Indian reservations. 64 It was hoped that the
general repealing clause would give Congress a clean slate on which to
58See Charley Carpenter, Note, Preempting Indian Preemption: Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 639, 641 (1990).59
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
601d.
61
Crow Tribe v Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
62Pub. L. No. 68-158,43 Stat. 224 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 398 (1983)).
63 Pub. L. No. 75-506, 52 Stat. 347 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 396a-396g
(1982)).
64Carpenter, supra note 59, at 658.
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legislate. This clause has led many scholars to argue that the 1924 Act
was repealed via the general repealing clause and thus states have no
authority to tax Indian mineral interests. 65 Despite these questions
regarding express authority to tax, states continued to tax tribal mineral
leases for the next forty years.'
It was not until 1985 that the Supreme Court addressed state
taxation of tribal leases. 67 In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,
68
the Blackfeet Tribe ("Blackfeet") contested the application of
Montana's oil and gas taxes on a lease entered into pursuant to the
IMLA. The Supreme Court held that the state could not impose a tax
that allowed the non-Indian mineral lessee unilaterally to deduct the
amount of the state's tax from the royalty due to the Blackfeet.69 The
Court invalidated this "pass through" scheme because it considered the
state's tax as a direct tax on the Indian's royalty interest rather than a
permissible tax on the non-Indian lessee. The Court viewed the "pass
through" of the tax's cost to the Blackfeet as a direct and therefore
impermissible state tax on Native Americans.
70
Furthermore, the Court clarified the effect of the RvILA on the
1924 Act. The Court observed that two canons of construction
indicated that the "taxing authority" of the 1924 Act was not implicitly
incorporated into the 1938 I1M[LA. 71 First, the Court noted that the
unique Indian preemption doctrine allowed states to "tax Indians only
when Congress has manifested clearly its consent to such taxation.
72
Second, the Court relied on the principle that "statutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit."73 Applying these two canons, the Court
found that the state lacked authority to impose this particular tax.
65
Judith V. Royster, MineralDevelopment in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal
Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TuLSA L. J. 541,572 (1993).
661d.6id.
671d
68Montana v Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
691d at 765.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court limited the scope of its
decision to instances where state taxes fell directly on the tribes rather
than state taxation of the tribes' non-Indian mineral lessees. 74 The
ruling did not prohibit state taxation of Indian mineral interests if the
non-Indian lessee paid the tax without passing the tax's cost along to the
tribe. This ruling increased the cost of mining activity on reservation
land because the non-Indian mineral lessees could no longer pass along
the costs of state taxes to their Indian lessors. 75 Furthermore, the costs
of reservation mining increased in many instances because the non-
Indian lessees were subject to double taxation if the tribes imposed their
own taxes on top of state taxes.
76
The Supreme Court directly addressed the permissibility of this
dual taxation system in its 1989 decision Cotton Petroleum Corporation
v. New Mexico.77 In this case, the Supreme Court held that the IMLA
did not bar state taxation of non-Indian lessees. 78 The Court concluded
that the significant role New Mexico played in providing services to
both the Jicarillo Apache Tribe and the Cotton Petroleum Corporation
justified the state's authority to tax.79  Furthermore, the Court
distinguished this decision from its summary affirmance of Crow 1180
by noting that in this instance New Mexico's tax was not "unusually
large.' '81 Nor did the Court perceive any violation of federal Indian
policy because of the "marginal effect" that a higher cost might have on
the demand for on-reservation leases.82 Thus, because Congress had
not prohibited either New Mexico or the Jicarillo Apache Tribe from
levying taxes, the Court concluded that "concurrent taxing jurisdiction
over all of Cotton's on-reservation leases exist[ed]."83
The Court did, however, limit the state's concurrent taxing
authority to the extent that the state may not impose a "discriminatory
74Royster, supra note 65, at 572.
751d.
761d. at 574.
77490 U.S. 163 (1989).
781d. at 182
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tax." 84 The Court indicated it would approve state taxes only if they are
"administered in an evenhanded manner and are imposed at a uniform
rate throughout the state--both on and off the reservation. '"' The
distinction the Court drew between its affirmance of Crow 1I and its
holding in Cotton Petroleum indicated that the concurrent taxing
authority was limited to cases where the taxes were not so "unusually
large" as to impose a "substantial burden. 86 However, the Court failed
to explain how at some "undetermined point... a state tax becomes
impermissibly burdensome." 87 The Court's only explanation of the
alleged distinction mentioned that Montana's severance taxes were
struck down because they had a "negative effect on the marketability of
coal produced in Montana." The Court observed that the Ninth Circuit
had found that Montana's taxes were "extraordinarily high" because
they were more than "twice that of any other state's coal taxes."8 8 The
Court's observations did little to aid in determining at what point a
state's tax becomes impermissibly burdensome. Thus, the Supreme
Court's holding in Cotton Petroleum obscures the boundaries of the
Indian preemption doctrine as it relates to states' authority to tax non-
Indian mineral lessees. For although there was no express
Congressional consent to the tax imposed by New Mexico, the Court
was willing to allow the state to impose a reasonable tax.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Majority Decision
In Crow Tribe, the Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsburg, held
that the Tribe was not entitled to recover the state and county taxes







Royster, supra note 65, at 578.
8
7Charles Breer, Note, Indian Law-Mineral Taxation- Are State Severance Taxes
Preempted When Imposed on Non-Indian Lessees Extracting Oil and Gas from Indian
Reservations [sic] Land?, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 435, 443 (1990).8 8Cotton Petroleum Corp. v New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 187 n. 17 (1989)(quoting
Motion to Affirm for United States, O.T. 1987, No. 87-313, p.12; 819 F.2d at 899 n. 2).
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conclusion, the Court rejected each of the two bases for the Tribe's
argument that it was entitled to receive the pre-1982 tax payments
Westmoreland had made to the state and Big Horn County. The Court
also undertook to "place in clear view" the "pathmarking decision" of
Cotton Petroleum.9
At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court reiterated the
general rule that "a nontaxpayer may not sue for a refund of taxes paid
by another."9 The Court then noted that this must have been the "rule
in mind" when the Ninth Circuit in Crow I observed that the Tribe was
not entitled to a refund of taxes that Westmoreland had already paid to
the state. This initial approach indicated that the Court's emphasis in
this situation was on the law rather than the equities of the case before
it.
Before the Court addressed the Tribe's first argument in support
of its claim, however, the necessity of explaining the holding in Cotton
Petroleum was noted. The Court emphasized that the IMLA did not
preempt a state from enacting a non-discriminatory tax for the on-
reservation production of oil and gas by a non-Indian mineral lessee.91
In so holding, the Court acknowledged that without some new
indication by Congress, "neither the IMLA, nor any other federal law,
categorically preempts state mineral severance taxes imposed, without
discrimination."92 The Court went on to again distinguish its holding
in Cotton Petroleum from its affirmation of the Ninth Circuit decision
in Crow II. The Court concluded that the difference between the two
decisions was based on the rate of taxation, not the ability of the states
to impose a tax. The Court observed that it had stated in Cotton
Petroleum that Montana "had the power to tax Crow coal, but not at an
exorbitant rate." 93 Again, however, the Court failed to clarify at what
point a tax becomes exorbitant.
The Supreme Court then addressed the Tribe's first argument
in support of its claim. The Tribe maintained that it should have
89Montana v Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S. Ct.1650, 1660(1998).
9 1d. at 1659. See, e.g., Furman Univ. v. Livingston, 136 S.E.2d 254, 256 (S.C. 1964).
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received Westmoreland's 1975-1982 tax payments because the mineral
lessee had simply paid the wrong sovereign.94 To support this
proposition, the Tribe relied on Valley County v. Thomas.9" Valley
County involved a Montana law requiring that motor vehicles be
licensed by the county in which the vehicle is owned and taxed. The
suit arose out of Valley County's claim that neighboring McCone
County had illegally issued licenses and collected fees for vehicles that
should be licensed only by Valley County. Valley County sued for both
monetary and injunctive relief. The Montana Supreme Court held that
if Valley County was truly the county entitled to license the cars, then
the county could "recover from McCone the fees McCone improperly
collected" rather than forcing vehicle owners to pay the license fee a
second time.96 Thus, the Tribe argued that Montana had levied taxes on
coal produced within the reservation that only the Tribe was entitled to
tax and that the Tribe should therefore be able to recover the improperly
collected fees from the state.
The Supreme Court distinguished Valley County from Crow
Tribe by noting that the Valley County case did not fit the facts of the
case before the Court. 97 In Valley County only one county had the
authority to license a particular motor vehicle. The Court made clear
that was not the case in Crow Tribe, "as Cotton Petroleum makes plain
neither the state nor the Tribe enjoys the authority to tax to the total
exclusion of the other."98 Instead, Crow Tribe involved a situation
where two governments had concurrent authority to tax.
Moreover, the Court stressed that prior to September of 1982,
the Tribe was unable to impose a tax on mining activity within the
ceded strip because it had yet to receive Department of Interior
approval. 99 The Court then noted that the "Tribe never sought judicial
review of the Department's pre-1982 disapprovals, . . that
Westmoreland would pay no tax to the Tribe absent Department
approval, . . . that Montana's taxes did not impede the Tribe from
94Id.
95109 Mont. 345, 97 P.2d 345 (Mont. 1939) (cited in Crow Tribe, 118 S.Ct. at 1660).
96
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gaining the Department's clearance .... and that Montana received no
share of the post 1982 tax payments released from the district court's
registry."100 The Court regarded these factors as significant "in holding
disgorgement an exorbitant, and therefore inequitable, remedy.' 1°
The Court then analyzed the Tribe's second argument in support
of its claim. This second prong of the Tribe's challenge posited the
theory that the Tribe was entitled to disgorgement because the state's
taxes had harmed the marketability of Crow coal by depriving the Tribe
of its "fair share of the economic rent."'102 The Court again disputed this
line of reasoning by noting that the Tribe had been unable to exact a tax
of any sort from Westmoreland prior to the 1982 amended lease
agreement because the Tribe had lacked the requisite Department of
Interior approval." 3 Furthermore, it was noted that the Tribe never
presented any evidence to prove that but for Montana's severance tax,
Westmoreland would have paid the Tribe a higher royalty." ° Thus, the
Court did not believe that the Tribe had proved that the state's tax had
harmed the marketability of Crow coal. The Court concluded by noting
that the Tribe had not sought compensatory damages based on actual
losses suffered. Further, the Court did not believe the Tribe had shown
any entitlement to such an award.0 5 Thus, the Court denied
compensatory damages based on lost coal sales as an alternative
remedy allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c). 6
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the district
court's assessment of the matter had been correct because the Tribe had
failed to prove its entitlement to total disgorgement of the pre-1982 tax
payments. The Court also observed that the Tribe failed to "develop a
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reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for
"further proceedings consistent with this opinion."'
08
B. Justice Souter's Partial Concurrence
Justice Souter wrote a separate opinion joined by Justice
O'Connor. In this opinion Justice Souter agreed with the majority
opinion to the extent it held that Cotton Petroleum made clear that
Montana's taxes were not invalidated because the state lacked authority
to tax Westmoreland's mining activity; rather, the Court invalidated the
taxes because they were "extraordinarily high" and affected the
marketability of Crow coal.'09 Nevertheless, Justice Souter disagreed
with the majority opinion to the extent that it appeared to foreclose the
district court from considering a partial disgorgement remedy. °
Justice Souter observed that the holding in Cotton Petroleum indicated
that the Tribe's original request for complete disgorgement was too
expansive; however, the "Tribe's prayer naturally encompasse[d] the
lesser claim to disgorgement of any taxes in excess of the state's
limit."'''
This partial concurrence departed from the majority opinion's
analysis in two ways. First, Justice Souter held that the majority's
"proffered distinctions came up short" regarding Valley County. 12
Instead, Justice Souter observed that the Valley County decision was
relevant in this instance because that case addressed the "disgorgement
issue.""13 Justice Souter noted that Valley County "turned on the
relative merits of the competing jurisdictions' claims of entitlement to
impose a tax."'" 4 Justice Souter explained that Valley County stood for
the proposition that a government that unlawfully collects a tax must
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collect the tax. 15 In this case, Justice Souter noted that the Tribe's
claim of authority to tax was "merely a way to recover or retain some
of the value of the Tribe's own property.",16 Whereas, the state's claim
'"was an appropriation of the Tribe's own property, just as it was an
invalid counterpart of the tax collection that would have been rightful
by the Tribe.""' 7  Justice Souter argued that to deny partial
disgorgement violated a fundamental principle of restitution - unjust
enrichment.'"' He contended that when one government unlawfully
taxes to the prejudice of another government, "accepted principles of
restitution entitle the latter government to claim disgorgement of what
the former had no business receiving.""' 9 Justice Souter viewed the
excessive portion of Montana's tax as being unlawfully collected. He
also believed that this excessive portion was a tax that the Tribe could
have legally collected. Thus, Justice Souter concluded that the Tribe
had sought "at least a facially valid claim when it seeks disgorgement
of the excess taxes collected by the state in the period before 1983."020
Justice Souter's second departure from the majority opinion
involved the.ability of the Crow Tribe to tax Westmoreland prior to
1982. Justice Souter noted that in light of Crow I's holding regarding
the scope of the Tribe's taxing authority over the ceded strip, one must
retroactively regard the mineral rights that underlay the ceded strip as
part of the reservation proper. Thus, the Tribe did indeed have a valid
tax in place as early as 1976 because the Department of the Interior had
approved the Tribe's tax for territory within the reservation. 2' This
analysis enabled Justice Souter to dismiss one of the obstacles that had
kept the majority from considering partial disgorgement as an
appropriate remedy.
Based on these two departures, Justice Souter regarded partial
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opinion "says it imposes no bar to the possibility of further remedial
action in the trial court.'12  Thus, Justice Souter concluded that
"nothing in this record disentitles the Tribe at least to press for




In the Crow Tribe decision, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the effect of Cotton Petroleum on the Indian preemption
doctrine; nevertheless, this area of the law remains unclear. While the
Crow Tribe holding did indicate that dual taxation will be allowed if the
state's tax is not "extraordinarily high," the decision failed to indicate
where the boundary between reasonable and impermissibly high state
taxation lies. The decision also raises the question to what extent
partial disgorgement may be a remedy.
The Crow Tribe decision did, however, clearly establish Cotton
Petroleum as the preeminent test for the Indian preemption doctrine.
The Court's continued application of the Cotton Petroleum analysis for
preemption greatly enhances states' ability to tax the on-reservation
mining activities of non-Indian lessees. Indeed, states may now impose
any tax on reservation mineral production by non-Indians so long as the
tax is reasonable. Thus, the Crow Tribe decision shows that dual
taxation has become a firmly entrenched doctrine in Native American
mineral law.
122Id. at 1665.123
1d.
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